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	On	12	December	2015,	195	countries	reached	agreement	on	a	new	climate	treaty	that	UN	Secretary-General	Ban	Ki-moon	described	as	‘a	monumental	triumph	for	people	and	our	planet’.1	The	Paris	Agreement	represented	a	remarkable	reversal	of	 fortune	 for	 the	 UN-sponsored	 climate	 negotiations.	 After	 adopting	 the	 UN	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	in	1992,	which	established	the	 objective	 of	 preventing	 dangerous	 human-induced	 climate	 change	 by	stabilizing	 greenhouse	 gas	 (GHG)	 concentrations	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 the	international	 community	 spent	 over	 two	 decades	 negotiating	 legally	 binding	rules	 on	 how	 to	 rein	 in	 global	 emissions.	 But	 despite	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 1997	Kyoto	 Protocol	 and	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 Clean	 Development	 Mechanism,	emissions	 of	 the	main	GHGs	 (carbon	dioxide,	methane	 and	nitrous	 oxide)	 rose	steadily	over	this	period.	The	2009	Copenhagen	conference,	intended	to	create	a	more	 effective	 successor	 treaty	 to	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 collapsed	 in	 acrimony,	leading	 many	 observers	 to	 conclude	 that	 multilateral	 climate	 diplomacy	 had	reached	 a	 dead	 end.	 Has	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 successfully	 broken	 the	 ‘global	warming	gridlock’?2	And	does	it	stand	a	chance	of	bringing	global	GHG	emissions	under	control?		This	article	reviews	and	assesses	 the	outcome	of	 the	21st	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP-21)	 to	 the	UNFCCC,	held	 in	Paris	 in	December	2015.	 It	argues	that	the	Paris	Agreement	does	indeed	break	new	ground	in	international	climate	policy.	COP-21	brought	to	an	end	over	20	years	of	UN	negotiations	focused	on	a	misguided	approach	of	establishing	mandatory	emission	reductions.	Instead,	the	Paris	 Agreement	 acknowledges	 the	 primacy	 of	 domestic	 politics	 in	 climate	change	and	allows	countries	to	set	their	own	level	of	ambition	for	climate	change	mitigation.	 It	 creates	 a	 framework	 for	 making	 voluntary	 pledges	 that	 can	 be	compared	and	reviewed	internationally,	in	the	hope	that	global	ambition	can	be	increased	 through	 a	 process	 of	 ‘naming	 and	 shaming’.	 By	 sidestepping	 the	
                                            1	‘COP-21:	UN	chief	hails	new	climate	change	agreement	as	“monumental	triumph”‘,	UN	News	Centre,	12	Dec.	2015,	http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52802#.Vx3cdKv87ww.	(Unless	otherwise	noted	at	point	of	citation,	all	URLs	cited	in	this	article	were	accessible	on	11	July	2016.)		2	David	G.	Victor,	Global	warming	gridlock:	creating	more	effective	strategies	for	
protecting	the	planet	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011).	
distributional	 conflicts	 that	 were	 inherent	 in	 the	 post-Kyoto	 negotiations,	 the	Paris	Agreement	manages	to	remove	one	of	the	biggest	barriers	to	international	climate	cooperation.	 It	recognizes	that	none	of	 the	major	powers	can	be	 forced	into	drastic	emissions	cuts.	However,	 instead	of	 leaving	mitigation	efforts	to	an	entirely	bottom-up	logic,	it	embeds	country	pledges	in	an	international	system	of	climate	accountability	and	a	‘ratchet’	mechanism.	In	this	sense,	the	Paris	climate	summit	heralds	the	beginning	of	a	new	era	in	international	climate	politics,	one	that	offers	the	chance	of	more	durable	international	cooperation.	While	the	Paris	Agreement	thus	establishes	a	more	realistic	approach	to	international	 cooperation	 on	 climate	 change	 mitigation,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	whether	 it	 can	 actually	 deliver	 on	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	 decarbonize	 the	 global	economy.	According	to	analysis	by	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat,	the	national	climate	policy	pledges	submitted	in	the	run-up	to	the	Paris	conference	would	result	in	a	global	warming	of	2.7°C	above	pre-industrial	levels,	and	this	estimate	is	based	on	the	 optimistic	 assumption	 that	 all	 national	 pledges	will	 be	 fully	 implemented.3	The	past	record	of	climate	policies	around	the	world	suggests	that	governments	have	a	 tendency	 to	express	 lofty	aspirations	but	avoid	 tough	decisions.	For	 the	Paris	Agreement	to	make	a	difference,	the	new	logic	of	 ‘pledge	and	review’	and	the	 subsequent	 ‘ratchet’	 will	 need	 to	 mobilize	 international	 and	 domestic	pressure	 and	 generate	 realistic	 expectations	 for	 more	 substantial	 climate	policies	 worldwide.	 It	 matters,	 therefore,	 whether	 the	 Paris	 Agreement’s	 new	approach	can	be	made	to	work.		This	 article	 offers	 a	 first-cut	 analysis	 of	 the	 new	 global	 governance	approach	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Paris	 Agreement,	 focusing	 on	 the	 mitigation	challenge.	 It	 begins	 by	 examining	 (in	 the	 first	 section)	 the	 changing	 context	 of	international	 climate	 politics	 between	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 Accord	 and	 the	2015	 Paris	 conference.	 The	 second	 section	 reviews	 the	 main	 elements	 of	 the	Paris	Agreement,	and	the	third	section	analyses	how	the	new	logic	of	the	climate	regime	 can	 work	 and	 what	 its	 limitations	 are.	 The	 final	 section	 sums	 up	 the	
                                            3	UNFCCC	Secretariat,	Synthesis	report	on	the	aggregate	effect	of	the	intended	
nationally	determined	contributions,	FCCC/CP/2015/7,	30	Oct.	2015,	http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf.	
argument	 and	 offers	 an	 outlook	 on	 the	 next	 steps	 in	 the	 international	 climate	process.	
	
From	Copenhagen	to	Paris:	the	changing	context	of	climate	politics		The	international	community	agreed	in	2010	that	it	would	seek	to	limit	the	rise	in	the	planet’s	average	air	temperature	to	no	more	than	2°C	above	pre-industrial	levels.	It	has	been	widely	accepted	for	some	time	that	global	warming	above	that	level	should	be	avoided,	although	some	scientists	argue	that	this	target	does	not	take	into	account	the	much	larger	heat	absorption	by	oceans	and	that	 it	should	therefore	 be	 lowered	 or	 abandoned	 altogether	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 broader	 set	 of	measures.4	To	have	a	reasonable	chance	of	staying	below	the	2°C	limit,	the	world	needs	 to	achieve	a	drastic	reversal	 in	current	GHG	emission	 trends.	With	some	gases	 (e.g.	 carbon	dioxide)	 staying	 in	 the	 atmosphere	 for	 a	 century	 and	 future	emissions	forecast	to	rise	if	no	action	is	taken,	globally	coordinated	measures	are	needed	 to	 bring	 emissions	 under	 control.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Environment	Programme	 (UNEP)	 estimates	 that	 global	 GHG	 emission	 levels,	 which	were	 at	52.7	 gigatonnes	 (GT)	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 equivalent	 in	 2014,	 should	 be	 brought	down	to	48	GT	by	2025,	and	42	GT	in	2030.	Carbon	dioxide	emissions	alone	will	need	to	be	reduced	to	net	zero—by	2060–2075	(from	35.5	GT	in	2014).5	The	magnitude	of	the	international	policy	challenge	is	hard	to	overstate.	Most	 of	 the	 global	 carbon	dioxide	 emissions,	 the	biggest	 source	 of	 the	human-generated	greenhouse	effect,	 result	 from	the	combustion	of	 coal,	oil	 and	gas.	 It	was	 the	 harnessing	 of	 these	 fossil	 fuels	 that,	 together	 with	 the	 technological	innovations	 of	 the	 industrial	 revolution,	made	 the	modern	 industrial	 economy	possible.	To	avert	the	threat	of	runaway	global	warming,	the	global	economy	will	need	 to	 be	weaned	 off	 carbon-intensive	 fuels.	 Unsurprisingly,	 therefore,	 global	
                                            4	David	G.	Victor	and	Charles	F.	Kennel,	‘Climate	policy:	ditch	the	2°C	warming	goal’,	Nature	514:	7520,	2014,	pp.	30–31.	5	UNEP,	The	emissions	gap	report	2015:	a	UNEP	synthesis	report	(Nairobi:	UNEP,	Nov.	2015).	Carbon	dioxide	equivalent	describes	the	global	warming	potential	for	a	mixture	of	GHGs,	which	includes	carbon	dioxide,	the	main	source	of	global	warming,	but	also	methane	and	nitrous	oxide.	‘Net	zero’	emissions	refers	to	a	balance	between	carbon	dioxide	emissions	and	their	reabsorption	through	sinks	(e.g.	forests)	or	technologies	that	extract	carbon	dioxide	from	the	air.	
warming	 is	 a	 uniquely	 challenging—some	 might	 say	 ‘wicked’6—global	 policy	problem.	Whereas	other	 forms	of	pollution	control	require	only	minor	changes	to	 industrial	 processes,	 the	 entire	 industrial	 system	 will	 need	 to	 be	 re-engineered	to	achieve	a	decarbonization	of	the	global	economy.	The	good	news	is	that	many	of	the	technologies	that	can	bring	about	this	transition	to	the	low-carbon	economy	already	exist,	from	renewable	energy	sources	(e.g.	solar,	wind)	to	improvements	in	energy	efficiency.	Some	innovations,	such	as	carbon	capture	and	storage,	are	on	the	horizon	but	are	yet	to	be	applied	on	a	commercial	scale,	while	others	(e.g.	high-capacity	nanobatteries,	synthetic	algae)	may	emerge	only	after	 substantial	 investments.	 Even	 so,	 replacing	 fossil	 fuels	 will	 prove	 more	difficult	 in	 some	 sectors	 (e.g.	 air	 travel)	 than	 others,	 and	 the	 world’s	 existing	energy,	 transport	 and	 urban	 infrastructures	 have	 already	 locked	 in	 decades	 of	future	carbon	emissions.	Despite	the	potential	co-benefits	(e.g.	improvements	in	air	quality	and	health)	that	low-carbon	investments	are	likely	to	yield,7	the	cost	of	 taking	 carbon	 out	 of	 global	 production,	 trade	 and	 investment	 is	unprecedented	in	the	history	of	environmental	politics.		The	political	challenges	are	no	less	daunting.	Although	all	major	emitters	have	 made	 a	 public	 commitment	 to	 fighting	 global	 warming,	 it	 has	 proved	difficult	to	translate	this	normative	engagement	into	collective	action.	One	facet	of	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 while	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 requires	 considerable	investment	 in	 the	 short	 run,	 the	 benefits	 of	 stabilizing	 the	 global	 climate	 will	materialize	 only	 in	 the	 medium	 to	 long	 run.	 This	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	governments	 to	 justify	 significant	 upfront	 expenditure,	 particularly	 given	 the	brevity	 of	 electoral	 cycles.	 Furthermore,	 climate	 change	 does	 not	 affect	 all	countries	 equally.	 Low-lying	 island	 states	 face	 an	 existential	 threat	 from	 rising	sea	 levels	 while	 others,	 especially	 countries	 near	 the	 Arctic	 Circle,	 may	experience	greater	agricultural	output	and	easier	access	to	natural	resources	as	a	result	of	the	thawing	of	permafrost.	In	any	case,	the	high	degree	of	uncertainty	in	predicting	long-term	climate	change	and	the	costs	and	benefits	associated	with	it	
                                            6	Kelly	Levin,	Ben	Cashore,	Steven	Bernstein	and	Graeme	Auld,	‘Overcoming	the	tragedy	of	super	wicked	problems:	constraining	our	future	selves	to	ameliorate	global	climate	change’,	Policy	Sciences	45:	2,	2012,	pp.	123–52.	7	Nicholas	Stern,	Why	are	we	waiting?	The	logic,	urgency,	and	promise	of	tackling	
climate	change	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2015),	p.	39.	
makes	it	difficult	for	governments	to	assess	where	their	national	interests	lie.	For	many,	then,	the	most	rational	line	to	take	may	seem	the	wait-and-see	approach.	And	even	 if	 some	emitters	were	 to	undertake	major	mitigation	measures,	 they	could	 not	 be	 certain	 that	 other	 emitters	 would	 reciprocate.	 Reducing	 national	emissions	 amounts	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 global	 ‘public	 good’	 from	 which	 all	countries	would	benefit,	with	concomitant	powerful	free-riding	incentives.	Such	uncertainty	 about	 the	 behaviour	 of	 other	 emitters	 militates	 against	 a	 strong	international	 agreement.	The	 international	politics	of	 climate	 change	 is	 further	complicated	 by	 the	 longstanding	 divide	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	countries	 over	 how	 to	 divide	 up	 the	mitigation	 burden,	 particularly	 in	 view	of	industrialized	countries’	historical	responsibility	for	the	bulk	of	emissions.8		International	 society	 originally	 tried	 to	 get	 around	 these	 difficulties	 by	creating	 an	 international	 climate	 regime	 with	 mandatory	 emission	 reduction	targets. 9 	International	 institution-building	 was	 meant	 to	 help	 build	 trust	between	emitters	and	reduce	the	threat	of	free-riding.	Following	the	example	of	the	 successful	 international	 negotiations	 on	 ozone	 layer	 depletion,	 climate	negotiators	set	out	 in	 the	early	1990s	to	create	 the	UNFCCC,	which	established	the	norm	of	climate	protection.	Building	on	this	universal	agreement,	they	then	hoped	to	negotiate	a	series	of	regulatory	instruments	that	would	set	ever-stricter	targets	for	GHG	emission	reductions.	The	first	such	treaty,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	of	1997,	 set	 relatively	 modest	 targets,	 which	 required	 industrialized	 countries	(listed	in	Annex	I)	to	reduce	emissions	by	an	average	of	5	per	cent	against	1990	levels.	 Critically,	 Kyoto	 exempted	 developing	 countries	 from	 similar	commitments,	 thereby	 establishing	 a	 strong	 form	 of	 differentiation	 that	postponed	mitigation	action	by	developing	countries	for	an	unspecified	time.	In	theory,	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 was	 meant	 to	 be	 only	 a	 first	 step.	 Much	 like	 the	Montreal	Protocol	on	substances	depleting	 the	ozone	 layer,	 it	was	meant	 to	be	revised	and	strengthened,	and	the	2009	Copenhagen	conference	was	expected	to	produce	 a	 successor	 agreement	 that	 would	 also	 include	 mitigation	 efforts	 by	
                                            8	J.	Timmons	Roberts	and	Bradley	C.	Parks,	A	climate	of	injustice:	global	
inequality,	North–South	politics,	and	climate	policy	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2007).	9	On	the	history	of	the	climate	negotiations,	see	Joyeeta	Gupta,	The	history	of	
global	climate	governance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).	
non-Annex	 I	 countries,	 some	 of	 which	 (e.g.	 China)	 had	 seen	 their	 emissions	increase	dramatically	in	the	years	since	Kyoto.	This	was	not	how	it	worked	out,	however.		In	the	end,	the	Annex	I	countries	were	able	collectively	to	comply	with	the	treaty’s	provisions,	but	this	did	little	to	slow	the	rise	in	global	emissions.	There	are	several	reasons	why	the	Kyoto	Protocol	does	not	offer	a	viable	approach	to	mitigating	 climate	 change.	 First,	 by	 setting	 a	 static	 emissions	 reduction	 target,	the	 regime	 failed	 to	 create	 dynamic	 incentives	 to	 decarbonize	 the	 economy.	While	 some	 countries	 (e.g.	 Canada)	 failed	 to	 meet	 the	 Kyoto	 targets,	 others	reduced	emissions	without	making	any	effort:	such	was	the	case	for	Russia	and	other	post-Soviet	states	 that	experienced	de-industrialization	after	 the	collapse	of	 communism.	 Second,	 agreeing	new	 targets	 for	 a	 second	 commitment	period	after	 2012	 proved	 difficult	 because	 the	 focus	 on	 legally	 binding	 targets	 had	turned	 the	 climate	 negotiations	 into	 a	 distributional	 conflict	 over	 respective	shares	 of	 the	mitigation	burden.	 Industrialized	 countries	 that	 had	 struggled	 or	failed	 to	 comply	 with	 Kyoto	 were	 reluctant	 to	 subject	 themselves	 again	 to	another	set	of	rigid	targets:	as	a	result,	Canada	withdrew	from	the	treaty	while	Japan	and	Russia	declared	 they	would	not	enter	 into	new	commitments.	Third,	the	rigid	divide	between	Annex	I	and	non-Annex	I	countries	had	made	it	difficult	to	 deal	 with	 the	 rapidly	 rising	 emissions	 of	 emerging	 economies	 that	 did	 not	want	 to	 stifle	 their	 future	 economic	development	by	 imposing	 limits	 on	 future	emissions.		Although	seen	as	a	 failure	at	 the	 time,	 the	2009	Copenhagen	conference	(COP-15)	succeeded	in	laying	the	ground	for	a	new	approach	that	has	now	come	to	fruition	in	the	Paris	Agreement.10	After	two	weeks	of	fruitless	negotiations	by	diplomats	 and	 regulatory	 experts	 at	 COP-15,	 a	 select	 group	 of	 heads	 of	 state	hammered	 out	 a	 political	 compromise	 deal,	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord,	 which	foreshadowed	 many	 of	 the	 elements	 now	 contained	 in	 the	 Paris	 Agreement.	Sidestepping	 the	 thorny	 issue	 of	 internationally	 agreed	 and	 legally	 binding	emissions	 targets,	 Barack	 Obama	 for	 the	 United	 States,	 Wen	 Jiabao	 for	 China,	
                                            10	Robert	Falkner,	Hannes	Stephan	and	John	Vogler,	‘International	climate	policy	after	Copenhagen:	towards	a	“building	blocks”	approach’,	Global	Policy	1:	3,	pp.	252–62.	
Manmohan	 Singh	 for	 India	 and	 other	 world	 leaders	 agreed	 to	 a	 system	 of	voluntary	pledges	as	the	basis	for	future	climate	action.	For	the	first	time,	major	emitters	 from	 the	 developing	world	 showed	 a	willingness	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	global	 mitigation	 effort	 without	 waiting	 for	 developed	 countries	 to	 fully	implement	their	existing	commitments.	The	Copenhagen	Accord	thus	finally	did	away	 with	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol’s	 ‘firewall’	 between	 Annex	 I	 and	 non-Annex	 I	countries,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 mitigation	 deal.	Copenhagen	also	saw	the	beginning	of	other	innovations	in	climate	policy,	from	the	Green	Climate	Fund	and	a	promise	of	up	to	US$100	billion	a	year	by	2020	of	climate	 finance	 to	 fund	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 in	 developing	 countries	 to	 a	system	 for	 monitoring,	 reporting	 and	 verification	 of	 emissions	 and	 financial	contributions.	Developments	 at	 the	 subnational	 and	 regional	 level	 are	 key	 to	understanding	 the	 gradual	 transformation	 that	 has	 occurred	 in	 international	climate	politics.	While	concern	over	climate	change	was	on	the	rise	throughout	the	 2000s,	 it	 was	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	 that	 critical	momentum	was	built	 for	 a	 global	 agreement.	 Even	 in	 countries	 that	 had	 been	 laggards	 in	 the	international	negotiations,	such	as	the	United	States,	a	groundswell	of	bottom-up	initiatives	 had	 begun	 to	 change	 the	 political	 agenda.11	Around	 the	world,	 local	community	 groups	 have	 sprung	 up	 to	 advance	 voluntary	 carbon	 emission	reductions;	multinational	corporations	have	increasingly	invested	in	low-carbon	business	opportunities	 and	adopted	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 approaches	with	 an	 explicit	 focus	 on	 climate	 change;	 institutional	 investors	 have	 begun	 to	demand	 greater	 transparency	 on	 climate	 risks	 in	 business	 operations;	 and	subnational	authorities	such	as	cities	and	municipal	governing	bodies	have	taken	it	 upon	 themselves	 to	 create	 climate	 mitigation	 pledges	 and	 policies. 12	Increasingly,	 these	 bottom-up	 initiatives	 have	 come	 together	 in	 transnational	networks	 that	 coordinate	 their	 activities	 and	 promote	 diffusion	 of	 climate	policies	throughout	the	world.	The	trend	towards	transnationalization	of	climate	initiatives,	which	gathered	pace	particularly	from	the	early	2000s,	has	embedded	
                                            11	Henrik	Selin	and	Stacy	D.	VanDeveer,	‘Climate	change	regionalism	in	North	America’,	
Review	of	Policy	Research	28:	3,	2011,	pp.	295–304.	12	Matthew	J.	Hoffmann,	Climate	governance	at	the	crossroads:	experimenting	with	
a	global	response	after	Kyoto	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	pp.	7–8.	
climate	 policy	 more	 deeply	 in	 the	 domestic	 agenda	 of	 leading	 emitters,	 has	helped	spread	low-carbon	policy	approaches	and	technologies	around	the	world,	and	is	stimulating	a	growing	interest	in	innovative	global	solutions.13	The	 growth	 in	 transnational	 initiatives	 has	 gone	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	strengthened	 domestic	 policy	 commitments	 to	 climate	 change	 mitigation.	 The	first	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 climate	 legislation	 found	 that	 the	 number	 of	climate	change	laws	and	policies	worldwide	doubled	every	five	years	since	1997,	with	 426	 climate	 change	 laws	 and	 policies	 in	 place	 by	 the	 time	 of	 the	 2009	Copenhagen	 conference,	 rising	 to	 804	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2014.14	Interestingly,	 this	applies	 not	 just	 to	 Annex	 I	 countries,	 which	 have	 traditionally	 led	 the	 way	 in	climate	legislation,	but	also	to	non-Annex	I	countries.15	The	effects	of	this	change	in	 domestic	 politics	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 China,	 which	 became	 the	 world’s	 largest	emitter	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 in	 2006.	 Not	 least	 in	 response	 to	 growing	 domestic	concern	 over	 extreme	 air	 pollution,	 but	 arguably	 also	 in	 response	 to	 external	pressure,	China’s	political	leadership	established	the	reduction	of	the	economy’s	energy	intensity	and	climate	 intensity	as	key	targets	 in	the	12th	Five	Year	Plan	(2011–2015),	in	line	with	commitments	made	at	the	2009	Copenhagen	summit.	The	 13th	 Five	 Year	 Plan	 (2016–2020)	 is	 set	 to	 expand	 the	 range	 of	 policy	instruments	 aimed	 at	 controlling	 emissions.16	In	 2014,	 China	made	 the	 largest	investment	in	renewable	energy	sources	of	any	country	in	the	world,	estimated	at	US$83.3	billion—more	than	double	the	United	States’	 investment	of	US$38.3	
                                            13	Harriet	Bulkeley,	Liliana	Andonova,	Michele	M.	Betsill,	Daniel	Compagnon,	Thomas	Hale,	Matthew	J.	Hoffmann,	Peter	Newell,	Matthew	Paterson,	Charles	Roger	and	Stacy	D.	VanDeveer,	Transnational	climate	change	governance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).	14	Michal	Nachmany,	Sam	Fankhauser,	Jana	Davidová,	Nick	Kingsmill,	Tucker	Landesman,	Hitomi	Roppongi,	Philip	Schleifer,	Joana	Setzer,	Amelia	Sharman,	C.	Stolle	Singleton,	Jayaraj	Sundaresan	and	Terry	Townshend,	The	2015	global	
climate	legislation	study:	a	review	of	climate	change	legislation	in	99	countries.	
Summary	for	policy-makers	(London:	Grantham	Research	Institute	on	Climate	Change	and	the	Environment,	2015),	p.	12.	15	Nachmany	et	al.,	The	2015	global	climate	legislation	study,	p.	20.	16	Fergus	Green	and	Nicholas	Stern,	‘China’s	changing	economy:	implications	for	its	carbon	dioxide	emissions’,	Climate	Policy,	forthcoming	in	print	but	available	online:	http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2016.1156515?journalCode=tcpo20.		
million	that	year.17	The	groundswell	of	domestic	climate	action	has	made	it	more	likely	that	major	emitters	will	contribute	to	a	collective	international	effort,	even	if	most	continue	to	oppose	mandatory	emissions	reductions.		One	important	factor	behind	this	shift	 is	the	growing	recognition	among	major	polluters	 that	 the	obstacles	 to	a	 low-carbon	energy	 transition	are	not	as	high	as	had	been	previously	thought.	As	more	and	more	emission-reducing	and	energy-saving	 policies	 have	 been	 put	 in	 place,	 gradual	 technological	improvements,	market	competition	and	greater	economies	of	scale	have	pushed	down	 the	 costs	 of	 low-carbon	 technologies.	 Solar	 photovoltaic	 energy,	 for	example,	has	become	a	cost-effective	energy	source	in	many	parts	of	the	world.	The	cost	of	photovoltaic	modules	has	 fallen	by	an	average	rate	of	about	10	per	cent	 per	 year	 since	 1980,18	and	 the	 fall	 in	 solar	 energy	 prices	 has	 speeded	 up	more	recently	as	China	has	ramped	up	solar-cell	production	from	50	megawatts	of	generation	capacity	in	2004	to	23,000	megawatts	in	2012.19	Thanks	to	falling	unit	costs	and	rising	overall	 investment,	renewable	energy	sources	contributed	almost	half	 of	 the	new	power	 generation	 capacity	 added	worldwide	 in	2014.20	Achieving	a	 rapid	 reduction	 in	 emissions	 is	 still	 perceived	by	many	 states	 as	 a	costly	affair,	but	major	emitters	have	grown	more	confident	that	a	gradual	shift	towards	a	low-carbon	economy	will	not	necessarily	harm	their	long-term	growth	strategies.	 This	 shift	 in	 attitudes	was	 clearly	 visible	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 2015	Paris	 climate	 summit.	 Having	 already	 agreed	 at	 the	 Copenhagen	 summit	 to	reduce	 the	 carbon	 intensity	 of	 its	 economy,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 now	signalled	that	it	was	willing	to	commit	to	no	further	rise	in	GHG	emissions	after	2030.21	The	United	States,	too,	has	indicated	a	greater	willingness	to	work	with	
                                            17	UNEP,	Global	trends	in	renewable	energy	investment	2015	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Frankfurt	School–UNEP	Collaborating	Centre	for	Climate	and	Sustainable	Energy	Finance,	UNEP	and	Bloomberg	New	Energy	Finance,	2015),	http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/attachments/key_findings.pdf.		18	J.	Doyne	Farmer	and	Francois	Lafond,	‘How	predictable	is	technological	progress?’,	Research	Policy	45:	3,	2016,	pp.	647–65.	19	Ed	Crooks	and	Lucy	Hornby,	‘Sunshine	revolution:	the	age	of	solar	power’,	
Financial	Times,	5	Nov.	2015,	http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/488483ca-8334-11e5-8e80-1574112844fd.html#slide0.		20	International	Energy	Agency,	World	Energy	Outlook	2015:	executive	summary	(Paris,	2015),	p.	1,	https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2015SUM.pdf.		21	Green	and	Stern,	‘China’s	changing	economy’.	
the	 international	 community	 to	 achieve	 significant	 emissions	 reductions.	Benefiting	from	a	switch	towards	shale	gas	and	a	reversal	of	previous	emissions	trends,	 the	 US	 administration	 under	 President	 Obama	 is	 now	 using	 existing	regulatory	authorities	to	shift	energy	production	away	from	coal.22	It	was	in	the	context	of	these	domestic	political	and	economic	shifts	that	the	 preparations	 for	 the	 2015	 Paris	 climate	 conference	 gathered	 momentum.	The	French	presidency	sought	to	keep	expectations	comparatively	low	to	avoid	any	 repetition	 of	 the	 emotional	 rollercoaster	 that	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	conference	 produced.	 Could	 Paris	 produce	 the	 breakthrough	 compromise	 the	world	was	waiting	for?	The	next	section	provides	a	brief	review	of	the	agreement	that	was	reached	at	COP-21,	and	the	subsequent	section	then	examines	whether	the	new	logic	of	internationally	coordinated	national	action	can	bring	about	the	required	push	for	reduced	GHG	emissions.		
	
Phoenix	from	the	ashes:	the	2015	Paris	Agreement			Scarred	 by	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 conference,	 negotiators	entered	the	COP-21	talks	with	a	clearer	sense	of	purpose	and	determination	to	reach	 an	 agreement.	 The	 Danish	 presidency	 having	 been	 widely	 blamed	 for	mishandling	 the	negotiations	 in	Copenhagen,23	the	French	presidency	prepared	the	ground	with	a	more	inclusive	approach,	skilfully	reaching	out	to	a	wide	range	of	 actors—governments,	 business	 leaders	 and	 NGOs—in	 the	 preparatory	meetings	for	COP-21.	When	the	conference	itself	opened	on	30	November	2015,	most	 negotiators	 and	 observers	were	 optimistic	 about	 reaching	 an	 agreement,	despite	a	long	list	of	critical	issues	that	still	needed	to	be	resolved.	The	presence	of	over	100	heads	of	 state	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	summit	underlined	 just	how	much	 climate	 change	 had	 gained	 in	 salience	 on	 the	 international	 agenda;	 and	
                                            22	Guri	Bang,	‘The	United	States:	Obama’s	push	for	climate	policy	change’,	in	Guri	Bang,	Arild	Underdal	and	Steinar	Andresen,	eds,	The	domestic	politics	of	global	
climate	change:	key	actors	in	international	climate	cooperation	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2015),	pp.	160–81.	23	For	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	negotiation	management	in	the	Copenhagen	conference,	see	Kai	Monheim,	How	effective	negotiation	management	promotes	multilateral	
cooperation:	the	power	of	process	in	climate,	trade,	and	biosafety	negotiations	(London:	Routledge,	2014).	
when	 French	 Foreign	Minister	 Laurent	 Fabius	 brought	 down	 the	 gavel	 late	 on	Saturday,	12	December,	one	day	later	than	scheduled,	there	was	a	strong	sense	of	historic	achievement	in	the	hall.	In	all,	196	parties,	comprising	195	countries	and	the	European	Union,	had	agreed	to	the	deal.		To	 be	 sure,	 the	 Paris	 negotiations	 benefited	 from	 skilled	 diplomacy.	However,	they	would	not	have	been	such	a	success	had	the	parties	not	aimed	for	a	 decentralized,	 bottom-up	 process	 of	 voluntary	 pledges.	 Because	 of	 the	 shift	away	from	Kyoto-style	top-down	regulations,	major	emitters	that	had	previously	blocked	progress	 in	the	negotiations	were	now	prepared	openly	to	support	the	new	agreement.	This	new	unity	 in	purpose	was	already	on	 show	 in	November	2014,	 when	 the	 United	 States	 and	 China,	 the	 world’s	 two	 biggest	 emitters	 of	GHGs,	 signed	a	bilateral	 agreement	on	 climate	 change	 that	 foreshadowed	 their	later	pledges	in	the	run-up	to	the	Paris	summit.24	Other	major	emitters	likewise	came	forward	to	make	their	own	pledges.	No	responsible	Great	Power	wanted	to	be	left	out	of	the	newly	emerged	climate	consensus.	One	 of	 the	 positive	 outcomes	 of	 this	 new	 approach	 was	 the	transformation	 in	 the	 international	process	 that	 allowed	 the	parties	 to	 achieve	important	breakthroughs	such	as	the	inclusion	of	a	more	ambitious	temperature	target.	 The	 Paris	 Agreement	 commits	 parties	 to	 ‘holding	 the	 increase	 in	 the	global	average	temperature	to	well	below	2°C’	(article	2(1)a).25	It	was	only	after	Pacific	island	states	demanded	a	reduction	in	the	target	to	1.5°C,	a	demand	that	civil	society	groups	also	supported,	 that	an	additional	clause	was	added	stating	parties’	commitment	‘to	pursue	efforts	to	limit	the	temperature	increase	to	1.5°C	above	 pre-industrial	 levels’.	 The	 Paris	 Agreement	 thus	 goes	 beyond	 the	previously	 agreed	 2°C	 target,	 even	 though	 1.5°C	 remains	 an	 aspiration	 rather	than	a	prescription.		
                                            24	Lenore	Taylor	and	Tania	Branigan,	‘US	and	China	strike	deal	on	carbon	cuts	in	push	for	global	climate	change	pact’,	Guardian,	12	Nov.	2014,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge.		25	Paris	Agreement,	FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1,	https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.		
Significantly,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 also	 includes	 a	 long-term	 emissions	goal,	 a	 key	 demand	 by	 civil	 society	 groups	 and	 developing	 countries.26	Article	4(1)	states	that	‘Parties	aim	to	reach	global	peaking	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	as	soon	as	possible’	and	to	achieve	‘a	balance	between	anthropogenic	emissions	by	sources	and	removals	by	sinks	of	greenhouse	gases	in	the	second	half	of	this	century’.	 The	 notion	 of	 emissions	 balance,	which	was	 referred	 to	 in	 an	 earlier	draft	 of	 the	 treaty	 as	 ‘emissions	 neutrality’,	 suggests	 that	 GHG	 emissions	 will	need	 to	 come	 down	 to	 a	 ‘net	 zero’	 level	 between	 2050	 and	 2100;	 UNEP	 had	previously	called	for	this	to	be	achieved	for	CO2	emissions	by	2070.27	In	contrast	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	which	lacked	long-term	targets,	the	Paris	Agreement	thus	sends	 an	 important	 signal	 to	 global	 markets,	 and	 especially	 to	 institutional	investors,	 though	 it	 is	 weakened	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 specific	 timetable	 and	uncertainty	 over	 the	 future	 use	 of	 carbon	 sinks.	 Achieving	 the	 Paris	 goals	will	require	global	 investment	 in	carbon	sequestration	programmes,	but	 large-scale	afforestation	 is	bound	to	create	 food	security	concerns,	while	the	technical	and	economic	viability	of	carbon	capture	and	storage	remains	uncertain.	In	order	to	achieve	long-term	emissions	reductions,	the	Paris	Agreement	obliges	 parties	 to	 submit	 pledges—so-called	 ‘nationally	 determined	contributions’	 (NDCs)—on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 It	 is	 this	 reliance	 on	 countries’	voluntary	 climate	 policy	 ambition	 that	 marks	 the	 most	 significant	 departure	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	approach.	Rather	than	establishing	a	set	of	quantitative	emissions	 reductions	 that	 are	 internationally	 agreed,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	sidesteps	the	distributional	conflict	 inherent	 in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	negotiations	by	 leaving	 it	 to	 individual	 countries	 to	 determine	 how	 much	 they	 wish	 to	contribute	to	the	collective	mitigation	effort.	NDCs	are	to	be	submitted	at	regular	intervals	of	 five	years	(article	4(9)),	and	the	agreement	expects	new	pledges	to	exceed	the	ambition	of	existing	ones	so	as	to	raise	the	climate	ambition	overall.	That	such	a	progression	of	climate	policy	ambition	will	be	needed	is	clear	from	the	 160	 ‘intended’	 NDCs	 that	 were	 submitted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 effort	 to	 create	political	momentum	behind	the	Paris	negotiations.	According	to	Climate	Action	
                                            26	Michael	Jacobs,	‘High	pressure	for	low	emissions:	how	civil	society	created	the	Paris	climate	agreement’,	Juncture	22:	4,	2016,	pp.	314–23.	27	UNEP,	The	emissions	gap	report	2014:	a	UNEP	synthesis	report	(Nairobi:	UNEP,	2014),	p.	xv.	
Tracker	estimates,	these	pledges	are	insufficient	to	prevent	global	temperatures	from	rising	beyond	2°C;	indeed,	they	are	projected	to	lead	to	global	warming	of	2.7°C	or	more.28		The	 main	 mechanism	 for	 raising	 the	 level	 of	 ambition	 in	 the	 climate	regime	 will	 be	 a	 regular	 review	 of	 progress	 made	 towards	 the	 agreement’s	temperature	goal.	A	first	interim	review,	known	as	the	‘facilitative	dialogue’,	will	take	place	in	2018,	prior	to	the	agreement’s	expected	entry	into	force.	The	first	formal	 review,	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 agreement	 as	 the	 ‘global	 stocktake’	 (article	14(1)),	 is	 scheduled	 for	 2023,	 with	 subsequent	 iterations	 every	 five	 years	thereafter.	 The	 outcome	 of	 these	 reviews	 is	 meant	 to	 inform	 parties	 as	 they	formulate	 future	 NDCs,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 ‘updating	 and	 enhancing’	 their	 pledges	(article	14(3)).	By	establishing	a	system	of	mandatory	national	reporting,	which	includes	information	on	national	emissions	by	sources	and	removals	of	GHGs	by	carbon	 sinks,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 makes	 transparency	 a	 key	 regulatory	instrument	 aimed	 at	 building	 trust	 between	 the	 parties	 and	 enabling	 them	 to	review	the	implementation	of	national	pledges	(article	13).		In	 a	 second	 major	 break	 with	 the	 regulatory	 approach	 of	 the	 Kyoto	Protocol,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 includes	 all	 countries	 in	 its	 mitigation	 effort.	Whereas	 the	 Kyoto	 treaty	 placed	 obligations	 to	 reduce	 emissions	 only	 on	 the	Annex	I	(industrialized)	countries,	the	new	agreement	obliges	all	emitters	to	take	nationally	determined	action	to	limit	global	warming.	First	foreshadowed	in	the	Copenhagen	Accord	of	2009,	this	new	inclusiveness	represents	a	major	advance	in	the	international	climate	negotiations,	which	have	hitherto	been	characterized	by	 a	 deep	 North–South	 divide	 over	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 UNFCCC	 principle	 of	‘common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities	 and	 respective	 capabilities’.29	The	Paris	Agreement	still	retains	a	degree	of	differentiation,	which	helped	secure	the	
                                            28	‘INDCs	lower	projected	warming	to	2.7°C:	significant	progress	but	still	above	2°C’,	Climate	Action	Tracker,	1	Oct.	2015,	http://climateactiontracker.org/news/224/indcs-lower-projected-warming-to-2.7c-significant-progress-but-still-above-2c-.html.	UNEP	estimates	a	higher	global	warming	trajectory	of	3.5°C	(UNEP,	The	emissions	gap	report	2015,	p.	xviii).	29	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘The	changing	fortunes	of	differential	treatment	in	the	evolution	of	international	environmental	law’,	International	Affairs	88:	3,	May	2012,	pp.	605–23.	
support	 of	 developing	 countries.	 Whereas	 developed	 countries	 ‘shall	 continue	taking	 the	 lead	 by	 undertaking	 economy-wide	 absolute	 emission	 reduction	targets’,	 developing	 countries	 ‘should	 continue	 enhancing	 their	 mitigation	efforts’	 and	 are	 only	 ‘encouraged’	 to	 move	 over	 time	 towards	 the	 kind	 of	emissions	 reduction	 or	 limitation	 targets	 that	 apply	 to	 the	 industrialized	countries	 (article	 4(4)).	 Individual	 countries	 can	 take	 their	 economic	circumstances	 into	 account	 in	 deciding	 where	 on	 this	 sliding	 scale	 from	‘mitigation	efforts’	to	‘absolute	emission	reduction	targets’	their	NDCs	should	be	located.	This	means	that,	in	principle,	emerging	economies	whose	emissions	rise	in	line	with	economic	growth	can	no	longer	hide	behind	their	official	developing	country	status	and	are	expected	to	make	a	bigger	contribution	to	global	climate	change	mitigation—a	key	demand	made	by	the	United	States	and	other	leading	industrialized	countries.30		Developing	 countries	 succeeded	 in	 their	 demands	 that	 the	 Paris	Agreement	 establish	 adaptation	 to	 climate	 change	 alongside	 mitigation	 as	 a	‘global	 goal’	 (article	 7(1)).	 The	 provisions	 in	 article	 7	 strengthen	 the	 existing	adaptation	 framework,	 among	 other	 means	 by	 subjecting	 national	 adaptation	policies	 to	 the	 five-yearly	 review	 mechanism.	 The	 new	 agreement	 thus	reinforces	 the	 growing	 recognition	 that	 climate	 change	 increasingly	 poses	 a	challenge	especially	to	poorer	societies,	as	failure	to	reduce	emissions	quickly	is	locking	 in	 dangerous	 global	 warming	 for	 decades	 to	 come.	 The	 parties	 also	recognize	that	 ‘support	for	and	international	cooperation	on	adaptation	efforts’	is	 needed	 (article	 7(6)),	 thereby	 underlining	 the	 importance	 that	 international	climate	finance	will	play	in	helping	developing	countries	to	adapt	to	a	warming	climate.	Developing	countries	 scored	a	 further	victory	 in	having	 the	concept	of	‘loss	 and	 damage	 associated	 with	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 climate	 change’	established	 alongside	 adaptation	 (article	 8). 31 	However,	 developed	 country	governments	 were	 adamant	 in	 their	 opposition	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 any	 legal	
                                            30	Andrew	Hurrell	and	Sandeep	Sengupta,	‘Emerging	powers,	North–South	relations	and	global	climate	politics’,	International	Affairs	88:	3,	May	2012,	pp.	463–84.	31	COP-19	in	2013	had	already	established	the	Warsaw	International	Mechanism	for	Loss	and	Damage	associated	with	Climate	Change	Impacts.	
liability	or	rights	to	compensation	arising	from	this	provision,	 thereby	blunting	the	practical	effect	that	this	new	provision	in	the	climate	treaty	is	likely	to	have.	As	in	previous	negotiation	rounds,	the	provisions	on	finance	proved	to	be	one	of	the	most	contentious	issues	in	the	Paris	conference.	Developing	countries	demanded	clear	rules	and	firm	commitments	on	financial	aid	for	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation.	Developed	countries,	having	already	promised	up	to	US$100	 billion	 annually	 in	 climate	 finance	 by	 2020,	were	 keen	 to	 ensure	 that	wealthier	emerging	economies	would	also	 contribute	 to	 climate	 finance	and	 to	avoid	entering	 into	 legally	binding	 commitments	 to	 specific	 funding	 flows.	The	Paris	 outcome	 is	 based	 on	 a	 broad	 compromise,	 calling	 upon	 developed	countries	 to	 provide	 finance	 that	 ‘should	 represent	 a	 progression	 beyond	previous	efforts’,	setting	a	floor	of	US$100	billion	annually	to	be	mobilized	after	2025,	 and	 including	 a	 new	 bi-annual	 requirement	 for	 developed	 countries	 to	‘communicate	 indicative	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 information	 .	 .	 .	 including	projected	 levels	 of	 public	 financial	 resources	 to	 be	 provided	 to	 developing	country	Parties’	(article	9(5)).	At	the	same	time,	the	agreement	does	not	include	any	 legally	 binding	 figures	 on	 financial	 assistance	 but	 continues	 to	 refer	 to	‘mobilizing	 climate	 finance	 from	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 sources,	 instruments	 and	channels’	 (article	 9(3)).	 It	 also	 encourages	 ‘other	 Parties	 .	 .	 .	 to	 provide	 such	support	 voluntarily’	 (article	 9(2)),	 thus	 opening	 the	 door	 for	 greater	 financial	contributions	from	China	and	other	emerging	economies.	One	of	the	key	reasons	why	it	was	possible	to	establish	broad	support	for	the	Paris	deal	was	the	carefully	crafted	legal	structure	for	the	agreement,	which	leaves	important	provisions	either	in	a	state	of	imprecision,	or	unenforceable,	or	out	 of	 reach	 of	 domestic	 courts.	 That	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 would	 be	 an	international	 treaty,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	Treaties,	had	become	clear	 in	 the	preparatory	meetings	 leading	up	to	 the	Paris	summit.32	However,	 not	 least	 to	 satisfy	 longstanding	 demands	 by	 the	 United	States,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 leaves	 it	 open	 to	 individual	 countries	 to	 decide	whether	 ratification	 by	 parliament	 or	 executive	 decision	 by	 government	 is	
                                            32	Daniel	Bodansky,	‘The	legal	character	of	the	Paris	Agreement’,	Review	of	
European,	Comparative,	and	International	Environmental	Law,	p.	6,	forthcoming	in	print	but	available	online:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/reel.12154/abstract.	
needed	 for	 them	 to	 accede	 to	 the	 treaty	 (article	 20).	 Furthermore,	 the	 careful	wording	 of	 key	 provisions	 ensures	 that	 only	 some	 create	 legal	 obligations	(‘shall’)	 while	 others	 merely	 express	 recommendations	 (‘should’)	 or	 create	expressions	of	 intent	or	opinion	(‘will’,	 ‘recognize’).33	Thus,	once	the	agreement	has	entered	into	force,	parties	will	be	legally	obliged	to	submit	NDCs	and	report	on	them	every	five	years,	but	failure	to	comply	with	their	own	national	climate	plans	 will	 not	 constitute	 a	 breach	 of	 international	 law.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	agreement’s	 compliance	 mechanism	 is	 explicitly	 designed	 to	 ‘be	 expert-based	and	 facilitative	 in	 nature	 and	 function	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 is	 transparent,	 non-adversarial	and	non-punitive’	(article	15(2)).	Even	where	parties	are	in	breach	of	treaty	 provisions,	 they	will	 not	 face	 punitive	 sanctions	 as	 they	might	 in	 other	international	agreements	such	as	those	of	the	WTO.		The	 question,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 whether	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 is	 legally	binding	or	not,	as	some	observers	have	argued.34	The	issue	is	whether,	given	its	peculiar	legal	structure,	which	restricts	legal	obligations	primarily	to	procedural	questions	and	 leaves	decisions	on	how	much	countries	contribute	to	the	global	climate	effort	in	their	own	hands,	it	can	make	a	difference	to	the	global	effort	to	avert	 dangerous	 climate	 change.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 examine	 the	 logic	 of	nationally	determined	climate	action	in	an	effort	to	shed	light	on	what	is	bound	to	 be	 the	 critical	 question	 for	 international	 climate	 policy:	 how	 can	 the	 Paris	Agreement	 stimulate	 more	 ambitious,	 and	 effective,	 mitigation	 efforts	 by	 all	major	emitters?		
	
Can	it	work?	The	new	logic	of	domestically	driven	climate	action		
                                            33	Bodansky,	‘The	legal	character	of	the	Paris	Agreement’,	pp.	6–7.	As	was	widely	reported,	last-minute	wrangling	over	the	use	of	the	word	‘shall’	instead	of	‘should’	in	a	single	clause	of	the	draft	text	nearly	derailed	the	adoption	of	the	treaty,	until	the	French	presidency	declared	that	a	‘typo’	was	to	blame	for	the	erroneous	use	of	‘shall’:	see	John	Vidal,	‘How	a	“typo”	nearly	derailed	the	Paris	climate	deal’,	Guardian,	16	Dec.	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal.	34	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	‘The	Paris	approach	to	global	governance’,	Project-
Syndicate,	28	Dec.	2015,	https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-agreement-model-for-global-governance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12.		
The	 Paris	 Agreement	 represents	 a	 significant	 departure	 from	 the	 regulatory	approach	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	the	beginning	of	a	new	phase	in	international	climate	politics.	To	be	sure,	 the	key	elements	of	 the	Paris	deal	had	been	 in	 the	making	 for	 some	 time,	 including	 at	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 conference	 and	 the	2011	Durban	conference.	But	given	the	relative	novelty	of	the	Paris	Agreement’s	approach—not	 to	 mention	 the	 vagueness	 of	 many	 of	 its	 key	 provisions—it	 is	difficult	 to	 assess	 at	 this	 point	 what	 effect	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 have.	 That	 some	observers	have	already	written	off	the	new	treaty	is	unsurprising,	not	least	when	we	 consider	 the	 unprecedented	 complexity	 of	 the	 task	 of	 decarbonizing	 the	global	 economy.35	But	 if	 we	 accept	 that	 most	 global	 governance	 offers	 only	second-best	 or	 ‘good	 enough’	 solutions,36	certain	 innovative	 elements	 of	 the	agreement	 can	 be	 identified	 that	 hold	 the	 promise	 of	 improving	 on	 regulatory	practice	 to	 date.	 It	 will	 be	 important	 to	 understand,	 therefore,	 under	 what	conditions	the	new	regulatory	logic	can	work.		In	 assessing	 the	 Paris	 Agreement,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 the	nature	of	the	global	policy	challenge.	More	than	two	decades	after	the	adoption	of	 the	UNFCCC,	 it	 is	 becoming	much	 clearer	 that	 effective	 climate	policy	 is	 not	about	 finding	 quick	 fixes	 to	 an	 emissions	 problem	 but	 putting	 in	 place	 the	structure	 for	 a	 long-term	 technological	 and	 economic	 transformation.	Averting	dangerous	 global	 warming	 will	 require	 major	 investment	 in	 low-carbon	technologies	and	a	redesign	of	existing	transport	and	urban	 infrastructures.	To	add	to	the	complexity	of	the	task,	all	of	this	will	need	to	be	achieved	on	a	global	scale	 and	 sustained	 over	 decades.	 Any	 expectation,	 therefore,	 that	 a	 single	international	 summit	 or	 treaty	 could	 provide	 the	 breakthrough	 solution,	 was	always	illusory.37	The	question	now	is	not	whether	the	Paris	Agreement	will	‘fix’	global	warming,	but	whether	 it	provides	a	 robust	yet	adaptable	 framework	 for	
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developing	and	sustaining	long-term	political	commitment	to	an	effective	global	response.	The	Paris	conference	will	therefore	be	judged	to	have	been	a	success	if	it	creates	the	right	mix	of	incentives	to	make	a	transition	towards	a	low-carbon	global	economy	more	likely.		The	 first	 thing	 to	 note	 is	 that	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 promises	 a	 more	realistic	 path	 towards	 globally	 coordinated	 emissions	 reductions,	 mainly	because	 it	 has	 managed	 to	 better	 align	 international	 climate	 policy	 with	 the	realities	of	international	climate	politics.	The	Paris	Agreement	gets	out	of	the	cul-de-sac	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 approach	 by	 removing	 two	 major	 structural	barriers	 to	 international	 cooperation.	First,	 it	accepts	 that	most	major	emitters	are	 reluctant	 to	 tie	 themselves	 into	 a	 rigid	 set	 of	 predetermined	 emissions	reductions	 that	 are	 legally	 binding.	 This	 reluctance	was	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	US	decision	 not	 to	 ratify	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol;	 it	 was	 also	 evident	 in	 emerging	economies’	disinclination	to	take	on	quantified	targets	for	mitigation	measures.	Second,	it	sidesteps	the	distributional	conflict	that	is	inherent	in	any	attempt	to	negotiate	mitigation	targets	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	international	agreement.	The	 difficulty	 of	 devising	 a	 fair	 burden-sharing	 arrangement	 is	 one	 important	reason	why	the	negotiations	on	a	post-Kyoto	climate	treaty	ended	in	failure.		While	this	transformation	of	the	international	process	on	climate	change	mitigation	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 COP-21	 outcome,	 it	 is	 worth	 reminding	ourselves	 that	 Paris	 did	 not	 invent	 the	 new	 logic	 of	 climate	 politics	 as	 such.	 It	merely	 rationalizes	an	already	emerging	 system	of	domestically	driven	climate	policy.	 For	 several	 years,	 a	 gap	 had	 been	 growing	 between	 the	 inertia	 and	gridlock	 that	 characterized	 the	 multilateral	 negotiations	 and	 the	 increasingly	active	 field	 of	 climate	 policy	 experimentation	 at	 national	 level.	 Although	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol	 created	 legally	 binding	 obligations	 for	 major	 industrialized	countries	 when	 it	 entered	 into	 force	 in	 2005,	 in	 reality	 it	 failed	 to	 play	 a	significant	 role	 in	 driving	most	 of	 these	 countries’	 domestic	 climate	 policies.38	For	 some	 (e.g.	 Russia,	 Canada	 and	 Australia),	 Kyoto	 had	 next	 to	 no	 effect	 on	national	emissions	paths,	while	others	 (e.g.	 Japan)	gradually	drifted	away	 from	the	treaty.	The	EU	was	arguably	the	only	group	of	major	emitters	that	remained	
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committed	 to	 implementing	 its	 commitments	 under	 the	 treaty;	 but	 even	 in	Europe’s	 case	 it	 is	difficult	 to	argue	 that	 international	 treaty	obligations	 rather	than	domestic	pressures	and	concerns	were	the	main	driver	of	climate	policy.	In	any	 case,	 with	 Canada,	 Russia	 and	 Japan	 having	 withdrawn	 from	 the	 treaty’s	second	commitment	period,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	now	covers	no	more	than	15	per	cent	 of	 global	 GHG	 emissions.	 Yet,	 paradoxically,	while	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol	 has	gradually	fallen	out	of	 favour,	most	major	emitters	have	if	anything	stepped	up	domestic	efforts	to	bring	emissions	under	control.	The	key	difference	is	that	they	have	 chosen	 policies	 that	 reflect	 domestic,	 rather	 than	 international,	 priorities	and	circumstances.		To	 some	 extent,	 therefore,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 offers	 a	 more	 realistic	chance	 of	 governments	 implementing	 their	 NDCs	 because	 climate	 change	 has	become	 a	 firmly	 established	 part	 of	 public	 policy	 around	 the	world.	Nearly	 all	major	 emitters	 of	 GHGs	 have	 established	 laws	 and	 regulations	 dealing	 with	emission	 controls,	 energy	 efficiency	 standards,	 forestry	management	 and	 low-carbon	 technological	 innovation.	 In	 total,	 nearly	 500	 laws	 related	 to	 climate	change	 have	 been	 introduced	 since	 1990.39	However,	while	 there	 is	 a	 uniform	trend	 towards	 greater	 legislative	 action	 on	 climate	 change,	 the	 drivers	 behind	countries’	 climate	 policies	 vary	 considerably.	 To	 some	 extent,	material	 factors	provide	 a	 reliable	 proxy	 explanation	 of	 a	 country’s	 stance	 on	 climate	 change.	Differences	 in	 countries’	 level	 of	 economic	 development,	 resource	 endowment	and	 exposure	 to	 climate	 impacts	 explain	why	 relatively	 poor,	 low-lying,	 island	states	without	 fossil	 fuel	reserves	(e.g.	 the	Maldives)	 favour	strict	 international	mitigation	 policies	 and	 international	 financing	 of	 local	 adaptation	 measures,	while	relatively	wealthy	countries	whose	economies	depend	on	the	exploitation	of	fossil	fuels	(e.g.	Saudi	Arabia)	tend	to	oppose	global	curbs	on	GHG	emissions.	For	most	other	countries,	which	find	themselves	in	between	these	two	extreme	cases,	 the	 situation	 is	 more	 complex.	 The	 costs	 resulting	 from	 climate	 change	impacts	 and	mitigation	measures	 tend	 to	 be	 unevenly	 distributed	within	most	societies,	 which	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 apply	 straightforward	 calculations	 of	aggregate	cost	and	benefit	to	explain	national	climate	policy	stances.	Significant	roles	are	played	by	other	factors	too,	such	as	societal	perceptions	of	climate	risk,	
                                            39	Nachmany	et	al.,	The	2015	global	climate	legislation	study.	
environmental	 values,	 sectoral	 business	 interests	 and	 political	 institutions.	Increasingly,	 climate	 policies	 are	 also	 driven	 by	 so-called	 ‘non-climate	 co-benefits’,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	Chinese	 restrictions	on	coal-fired	energy	production	owing	to	domestic	concern	over	high	levels	of	urban	air	pollution.		The	 Paris	 Agreement	 follows	 this	 trend	 in	 soliciting	 domestically	determined	mitigation	pledges,	 but	 adds	an	 important	 international	dimension	to	 this	 groundswell	 of	 domestic	 climate	 action.	 As	 Keohane	 and	 Oppenheimer	argue,	Paris	is	designed	to	create	a	peculiar	‘two-level	game’	logic	that	connects	domestic	 climate	politics	with	 the	 strategic	 interaction	between	countries.40	By	subjecting	 domestically	 determined	 mitigation	 pledges	 to	 the	 international	review	 mechanism,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 ensures	 that	 the	 gap	 between	 the	required	 level	 of	 action	 and	 the	 total	 sum	 of	 national	 measures	 becomes	 the	subject	 of	 international	 policy	 deliberation	 and	 coordination.	 Paris	 turns	what	would	 otherwise	 be	 a	 decentralized,	 bottom-up	policy-making	 approach	 into	 a	hybrid	system	that	combines	bottom-up	with	top-down	elements.		For	this	hybrid	system	to	work,	the	Paris	Agreement	needs	to	put	in	place	a	transparency	regime	that	makes	national	policies	 internationally	comparable.	Transparency	 is	 a	 key	 condition	 for	 making	 national	 pledges	 credible	 and	building	 trust	 between	 major	 emitters.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Paris	 conference	delivered	mixed	results	at	best.	While	it	brings	us	one	step	closer	to	comparable	mitigation	 pledges	 and	 policies,	 laying	 down	 principles	 for	 an	 integrated	reporting	system	that	has	been	in	the	making	for	some	time	under	the	auspices	of	 the	 UNFCCC,	 it	 did	 not	 deliver	 the	 specific	 rules	 that	 will	 govern	 the	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	of	emissions	and	national	implementation	of	 those	 pledges	 and	 policies.	 Given	 that	 many	 countries	 have	 been	 wary	 of	ceding	 control	 over	 what	 and	 how	 they	 report	 to	 the	 UNFCCC,	 it	 will	 take	considerable	 effort	 at	 future	 COPs	 to	 negotiate	 the	 modalities	 of	 the	 new	transparency	regime.		Getting	 transparency	 right	 will	 be	 of	 critical	 importance	 to	 the	 Paris	Agreement’s	review	mechanism,	which	is	the	central	tool	for	driving	up	ambition	
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within	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	review	mechanism	is	likely	to	generate	pressure	on	states	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	peer	pressure	among	states.	At	the	five-yearly	review	 sessions,	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 will	 ideally	 be	 able	 to	establish	which	countries	have	delivered	on	their	previous	pledges	and	whether	new	 and	more	 ambitious	 pledges	 are	 needed	 to	meet	 the	 temperature	 target.	The	 formalized	 review	 process	 will	 create	 regular	 moments	 for	 ‘naming	 and	shaming’	 strategies	 to	 be	 deployed	 against	 those	 countries	 that	 fall	 short	 of	international	 expectations.	 Given	 that	 mitigation	 pledges	 will	 be	 determined	independently	 by	 each	 party	 and	 cannot	 be	 enforced	 through	 the	 regime’s	compliance	mechanism,	international	review	and	peer	pressure	will	be	the	main	multilateral	tools	for	parties	to	strengthen	the	credibility	of	their	pledges.	In	an	ideal	scenario,	leaders	in	climate	policy	will	use	the	review	mechanism	to	signal	high	ambition	and	exhort	laggards	to	raise	their	game,	in	the	hope	that	successful	implementation	 of	 voluntary	 pledges	 will	 create	 a	 positive	 spiral	 of	strengthening	 trust	 and	 enhanced	 cooperation.	 A	more	 pessimistic	 scenario	 is	also	 possible,	 however.	 Regular	 reviews	 may	 reveal	 wide	 gaps	 between	countries’	mitigation	pledges	and	national	implementation,	creating	a	downward	spiral	of	weakening	trust	and	lower	ambition.		It	is	not	unusual	for	global	governance	to	combine	a	transparency	regime	with	 peer	 pressure.	 Such	 an	 approach	 rests	 on	 the	 idea	 that,	 as	 Ian	 Johnstone	argues,	‘states	care	about	collective	judgment	of	their	conduct	because	they	have	an	 interest	 in	 reciprocal	 compliance	 by	 and	 future	 cooperation	with	 others’.41	Naming	 and	 shaming	 mechanisms	 operate	 within	 diverse	 global	 governance	contexts,	from	the	International	Labour	Organization	to	human	rights	bodies	and	corporate	social	responsibility	institutions.42	They	are	usually	seen	as	a	fallback	mechanism	 where	 formal	 compliance	 and	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 are	unavailable	or	fail	to	work.		
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In	 the	case	of	climate	change	as	 in	other	areas,	 the	effectiveness	of	peer	pressure	will	depend	on	two	factors:	first,	the	degree	to	which	governments	are	sensitive	 to	 international	 opprobrium	 and	 reputational	 loss;	 and	 second,	 the	number	 of	 countries	 that	 are	 non-compliant	 or	 fail	 to	 live	 up	 to	 international	expectations.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 past	 record	 of	 international	 climate	 politics	offers	little	comfort	in	this	respect.	Time	and	again,	major	emitters	have	shown	themselves	willing	 to	 accept	 a	 loss	 in	 international	 reputation	when	 domestic	economic	 priorities	 have	 been	 at	 stake.	 The	 United	 States,	 the	 world’s	 largest	emitter	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 until	 2006,	was	 the	 only	 industrialized	 country	 that	refused	 to	 ratify	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol.	 Having	withdrawn	 its	 signature	 from	 the	treaty	 in	 2001,	 the	 US	 stood	 firm	 in	 its	 opposition	 to	 mandatory	 emissions	reductions	 despite	 facing	 universal	 condemnation.43	Canada	 likewise	 ignored	international	 protests	 when	 it	 became	 the	 first	 country	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol	 in	 2012.	 And	 at	 the	 Copenhagen	 conference	 in	 2009,	 emerging	economies	such	as	China	and	 India	successfully	 resisted	 international	pressure	to	subject	their	economies	to	internationally	agreed	mitigation	targets.	It	should	be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 in	 all	 these	 instances	 major	 emitters	 not	 only	 chose	domestic	priorities	over	international	concerns	but	actively	challenged	the	idea	of	 internationally	 agreed	 and	 legally	 binding	 emissions	 reduction	 targets.	 The	Paris	 Agreement	 provides	 a	 different	 context	 in	which	major	 emitters	 can	 set	their	own	targets	but	need	to	account	 for	 their	actions	 internationally.	With	all	major	emitters	having	committed	 to	making	 the	Paris	deal	work,	 the	enhanced	legitimacy	of	the	agreement	should,	therefore,	increase	most	countries’	sense	of	obligation	 and	 responsibility,	 though	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 this	 alone	will	 override	conflicting	domestic	interests.	The	 second	mechanism	 on	which	 the	 Paris	 Agreement’s	 review	 system	relies	 is	naming	and	shaming	by	civil	society.	When	reporting	on	their	national	emissions	 and	 implementation	 of	 international	 pledges,	 governments	 also	 face	scrutiny	by	 environmental	 campaign	groups	 and	media	organizations.	Much	of	this	 scrutiny	 happens	 in	 a	 domestic	 context,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 exercised	 by	 NGOs	
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operating	transnationally.	After	all,	NDCs	have	an	 important	signalling	effect	 to	domestic	 constituencies,	 indicating	 a	 government’s	 green	 credentials	 at	 home	and	environmental	leadership	internationally.	Some	governments	will	also	move	to	 enshrine	 international	 pledges	 in	 domestic	 legislation,	 thereby	 exposing	themselves	 to	 more	 systematic	 domestic	 scrutiny	 through	 parliaments	 and	courts.	Some	NGOs	already	perform	a	quasi-monitoring	role	 in	climate	politics.	Environmental	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Resources	 Institute,	 Climate	Action	 Tracker	 and	 Civil	 Society	 Review	 already	 provide	 important	 data	 and	analysis	on	global	emissions	trends	and	national	performance.	 In	the	run-up	to	the	Paris	summit	they	highlighted	the	gap	between	what	countries	had	pledged	in	their	INDCs	and	the	level	of	collective	action	that	would	be	consistent	with	the	2°C	 target. 44 	Once	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 enters	 into	 force,	 civil	 society	organizations	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 continue	 to	 scrutinize	 national	 policies	 and	their	implementation,	and	to	calculate	the	world’s	remaining	carbon	budget	and	the	additional	efforts	states	will	need	 to	make	 to	stay	within	 this	budget.	As	 in	other	 contexts,	 civil	 society	 can	 therefore	 be	 expected	 to	 take	 on	 the	 role	 of	informal	monitor	of	the	climate	agreement,	using	naming	and	shaming	tactics	to	target	those	governments	that	shirk	their	responsibilities.45	Despite	the	important	role	that	non-state	actors	can	play	in	this	area,	the	outlook	 for	 accountability	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 civil	 society	 is	 uncertain	 and	 highly	uneven.	Domestic	monitoring	of	national	policies	depends	on	the	capacity	of	civil	society	to	organize	and	exert	pressure	on	governments	and	the	degree	to	which	civil	 society	 enjoys	 a	 permissive	 environment	 domestically.	 Research	 on	domestic	 environmental	 politics	 reveals	 starkly	 divergent	 fortunes	 for	environmental	NGOs,	for	example	between	those	operating	in	democratic	states	with	open,	pluralistic	political	cultures	and	those	that	face	tight	political	control	by	 autocratic	 regimes.	 As	 Bailey	 and	 Tomlinson	 point	 out,	 the	 ‘safe	 operating	space’	for	independent	monitoring	is	shrinking	in	many	countries,	and	especially	
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‘in	 precisely	 those	 countries	 where	 [it	 is]	 most	 needed’. 46 	There	 are	 also	important	 differences	 in	 levels	 of	 domestic	 mobilization,	 engagement	 and	financing	 of	 NGO	 activities,	 with	 the	 dividing	 line	 often	 falling	 between	 richer	and	 poorer	 societies.	 To	 some	 extent,	 transnational	 campaign	 groups	 can	substitute	 for	 domestic	 activism	 in	 countries	 that	 lack	 a	 vibrant	 civil	 society.47	Even	so,	we	should	not	expect	the	monitoring	ability	of	civil	society	to	be	equally	distributed	around	the	world.		Finally,	 given	 that	 the	 decarbonization	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 will	 be	down	 to	 decisions	 by	 economic	 actors,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	will	 ultimately	 be	judged	 by	 the	 effect	 it	 has	 on	 global	 markets.	 International	 regimes	 and	governmental	regulation	can	provide	a	supportive	regulatory	framework,	but	it	is	 companies	 that	 decide	 on	 the	 direction	 of	 technological	 innovation,	 R&D	expenditure	and	investment	flows.	In	this	context,	an	international	treaty	such	as	the	Paris	Agreement	can	hope	to	shape	business	decisions	in	three	ways:	it	can	send	a	signal	to	markets	about	the	international	community’s	long-term	political	objectives;	it	can	put	in	place	governance	mechanisms	that	create	incentives	for	low-carbon	 business	 decisions;	 and	 it	 can	 encourage	 and	 support	 voluntary	efforts	by	private	actors.		With	 regard	 to	 signalling,	 global	 business	 leaders	 had	 encouraged	governments	 to	 create	 an	 ambitious	 climate	 agreement	 that	 would	 produce	certainty	 for	 long-term	 investment	 decisions. 48 	By	 strengthening	 the	temperature	 target	 and	 adopting	 carbon	 neutrality	 as	 the	 long-term	 goal,	 the	Paris	Agreement	does	indeed	send	a	clear	signal	to	global	markets,	marking	out	the	 long-term	direction	 of	 travel	 for	 the	 global	 economy.	However,	 the	 lack	 of	detail	 on	 the	 timeframe	 for	 and	 pathway	 towards	 long-term	 carbon	 neutrality	has	weakened	the	strength	of	the	signal.	Furthermore,	the	Paris	Agreement	put	
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in	 place	 a	 framework	 for	 creating	 governance	mechanisms,	 but	 postponed	 the	tricky	task	of	agreeing	specific	rules.	The	parties	renewed	international	support	for	developing	and	expanding	carbon	markets,	endorsing	the	creation	of	a	new	type	of	carbon	asset,	so-called	‘internationally	transferred	mitigation	outcomes’.	They	 also	 established	 an	 UNFCCC-governed	 mechanism	 that	 will	 support	international	transfers	of	emission	reductions,	but	without	agreeing	the	specific	rules	and	procedures	that	will	govern	it;	these	will	need	to	be	agreed	by	future	COPs.	 And	 finally,	 the	 Paris	 conference	 became	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	wide	 range	 of	 voluntary	 initiatives	 that	 engage	 business	 actors	 and	 others	 in	collaborative	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 emissions,	 promote	 best-practice	 models	 and	encourage	 technology	 transfer.49	In	 this	 way,	 the	 Paris	 accord	 can	 become	 an	‘orchestrator’	of	climate	action	well	beyond	the	realm	of	traditional	international	governance,	 drawing	 on	 the	 governance	 capabilities	 of	 other	 actors	 that	 the	climate	regime	itself	lacks.50	Notwithstanding	all	these	positive	elements,	it	is	clear	that	the	within	the	new	logic	of	nationally	determined	climate	action,	the	Paris	Agreement	cannot	be	expected	to	‘fix’	the	climate	problem;	it	can	only	provide	a	supportive	framework	within	which	states	and	other	actors	can	achieve	the	required	emissions	cuts.		
	
Conclusions			The	 COP-21	 outcome	 has	 been	 rightly	 welcomed	 as	 a	 major	 breakthrough	 in	international	climate	diplomacy.	After	years	of	fruitless	efforts	to	strike	a	global	deal	on	mandatory	emissions	reductions,	the	new	regulatory	approach	adopted	by	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 managed	 to	 transform	 the	 international	 negotiations	from	 a	 distributional	 conflict	 over	 legally	 binding	 targets	 into	 a	 bottom-up	process	of	voluntary	mitigation	pledges.	By	allowing	countries	to	determine	their	mitigation	efforts	independently,	it	removed	a	key	barrier	that	had	held	back	the	post-Kyoto	 negotiations.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 new	 climate	 treaty	 obliges	
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emitters	 to	 report	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 their	 pledges	 and	 review	 their	actions	 at	 regular	 intervals,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 creating	 political	momentum	 for	 a	strengthening	 of	mitigation	 efforts.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 hopes	 to	create	 what	 might	 be	 called	 ‘soft	 reciprocity’,	 whereby	 leading	 states	 initiate	ambitious	climate	policies	that	encourage	others	to	reciprocate	by	raising	their	own	 level	 of	 ambition.	 In	 a	 context	where	 national	mitigation	 pledges	 are	 not	legally	 binding	 and	 cannot	 be	 enforced,	 the	 main	 currencies	 of	 international	climate	politics	will	 thus	be	political	 leadership,	 financial	 assistance	 and	moral	suasion.		Whether	the	Paris	Agreement	can	produce	the	desired	effect	of	boosting	the	 global	 mitigation	 effort	 remains	 to	 be	 seen.	 This	 critically	 depends	 on	whether	its	core	mechanism	of	five-yearly	reviews	can	be	made	to	work.	For	this	to	happen,	a	robust	transparency	framework	for	the	reporting	and	verification	of	emissions	reduction	pledges	and	their	national	 implementation	will	be	needed.	COP-21	 established	 the	 principles	 for	 this	 framework,	 but	 future	 negotiations	will	need	to	create	specific	transparency	rules	and	mechanisms.	It	also	remains	to	 be	 seen	 whether	 peer	 pressure	 between	 states	 and	 ‘naming	 and	 shaming’	strategies	by	NGOs	can	nudge	recalcitrant	states	into	greater	ambition.	The	Paris	negotiations	 managed	 to	 produce	 a	 high	 level	 of	 political	 mobilization	 and	support	 on	 the	 part	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 business,	 which	 in	 itself	 is	 a	 major	achievement.	But	 it	would	 take	only	a	small	number	of	 large	emitters	 to	derail	global	efforts	to	stay	within	the	temperature	target	of	below	2°C.	Given	that	the	world	 is	 currently	 on	 course	 for	 a	 global	 warming	 trend	 of	 3°C	 or	 more,	 the	margin	of	error	for	the	new	climate	regime	is	worryingly	small.		In	the	context	of	the	new	logic	of	domestically	determined	climate	policy,	much	will	 depend	on	whether	 climate	 leaders	 are	willing	 and	 able	 to	push	 for	more	ambitious	policies,	 invest	 in	 green	 technologies	 and	 chart	 the	way	 into	a	low-carbon	 economic	 future.	 Such	 leadership	 could	 be	 provided	 by	 states	 that	seek	 to	 move	 faster	 and	 further	 with	 decarbonization	 plans	 than	 their	 peers.	Small	groups	of	states,	acting	in	‘coalitions	of	the	willing’	or	‘climate	clubs’,	may	emerge	 to	 create	 regional	 carbon	 trading	 schemes	 or	 promote	 technology	
transfer	schemes.51	Leadership	could	also	be	provided	by	non-state	actors,	most	notably	 business	 organizations	 and	 NGOs	 that	 come	 together	 to	 establish	transnational	 climate	 actions	 and	 voluntarily	 cooperate	 to	 pursue	 low-carbon	strategies.	 The	 Paris	 Agreement	 will	 benefit	 from	 such	 forms	 of	 climate	leadership,	 and	 it	 can	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 providing	 a	 supportive	environment	in	which	innovative	initiatives	can	be	encouraged	and	nurtured.	As	 should	 be	 clear	 from	 the	 above	 discussion,	 much	 of	 the	 Paris	Agreement’s	 potential	 contribution	 remains	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 future	 COP	negotiations.	 Paris	 was	 a	 breakthrough	 event,	 but	 it	 did	 not	 ‘fix’	 the	 climate	problem.	Nor	could	it	have	hoped	to	do	so.	International	climate	diplomacy	has	finally	caught	up	with	the	reality	of	the	global	warming	problem,	which	requires	a	 long-term	political	effort	 to	steer	global	 investment	 in	 the	direction	of	a	 low-carbon	 economic	 future.	 Paris	 provides	 a	more	 realistic	 approach	 to	 achieving	this	 vision,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 the	 end	 of	 this	 journey;	 in	 many	 ways	 it	 is	 only	 the	beginning.		
                                            51	Robert	Falkner,	‘A	minilateral	solution	for	global	climate	change?	On	bargaining	efficiency,	club	benefits	and	international	legitimacy’,	Perspectives	on	
Politics	14:	1,	2016,	pp.	87–101. 
